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INTRODUCTION
We never cease living in a world of perception, but we bypass
it in critical thought almost to the point of forgetting the
contribution of perception to our idea of truth. For critical
thought encounters only bare propositions which it discusses,
accepts, or rejects. Critical thought has broken with the
naive evidence of things, and when it affirms, it is because
it no longer finds any means of denial. However necessary
this activity of verification may be, specifying criteria
and demanding from our experience its credentials of validity,
it is not aware of our contact with the perceived world which
is simply there before us, beneath the level of the verified
true and false. 1
Anyone who reads the works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty attentively
will note the groping character of his thought. Ideas which in a given
passage begin to delineate themselves are assigned further shades of
meaning in the next, not simply because Merleau-Ponty wants to acquaint
the peruser gradually with a thought that is already fully elaborated
in his mind but because he, himself, is still searching and seeking
greater clarity. For Merleau-Ponty, the groping is not a question of
descending to the level of the reader but delineates a thinker who
himself, while writing, is still pursuing the truth. One must there
fore abstain from ascribing to Merleau-Ponty definitive and sharply
circumscribed concepts.
The artist, as well as the philosopher, does not seek to dwell
in a world in which all the boundaries are traced, in which the meaning
Alden L. Fisher, ed., "An Unpublished Text by Maurice
Merleau-Ponty: A Prospectus of His Work," in The Essential Writings
of Merleau-Ponty (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1969),
p. 367.
2of reality is clearly defined. It is an individual who by means of
a certain attitude determines the lines assumed by these realms of
making and thinking. He delineates them from the scope of being that
precedes them only to find that this scope is a chiaroscuro and has
no room for Cartesian clear and distinct ideas which pertain to
mathematics and pure logic. In this realm of existence all is inter
woven and therefore refers to itself and to everything else, so that
lines of demarcation would do violence to this interconnection. While
the artist may, indeed must, try to form concepts of this primordial
level of existence, he should also keep in mind that on this level
the concept will have to be permeated with flexibility, ambiguity,
density, and the obscurity that is demanded by this ontology.
CHAPTER I
THE EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY OF
MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY
Existentialism is a fundamental position from which to view
human experience. It seeks to go beyond or underneath the abstracting
mind and all its intellectual edifices, bent on restoring a pre
sumption-less standpoint from which immediate concrete experience
can be directly confronted and examined. In searching for a way
of delivering the active consciousness from purposeful involvements,
it also frees itself to see what is there to be seen, and to see
itself at the same time. It is a philosophy that recognizes the
world of the individual as a contingent situation and an unfinished
task that demands each of us to undertake a rational description of
the structures or systems of our individual situation.
To study the individual situation requires the study of
essences of which the phenomenological viewpoint becomes a necessity.
Phenomenology is therefore the study of essences, and eventually all
problems amount to finding definitions of essences. It is also a
philosophy which puts essences back into existence, and does not
expect to arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any
other point than that of their facticity. Phenomenology is trans-
Arturo B. Fallico, Art and Existentialism, (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 1.
4cendental in that it places in obeyance the assertions rising out of
the natural attitude in order to understand them, and maintains that
the world is always there before reflection begins. It acts as an
inalienable presence with all its efforts concentrated upon the
reachievement of a direct and primitive contact with the world, and
2
endows that contact with a philosophical status.
Although phenomenology is a matter of description, it is not
a method of analysis or explanation. It is a return to things themselves
and is from the start a rejection of science. Science has not, and
never will have by its very nature, the same significance of being as
the world which we perceive, for the simple reason that it is a rationale
or explanation of that world. Merleau-Ponty writes in The Phenomenology
of Perception the following:
I am, not a living creature nor even a man, nor again even a
consciousness endowed with all the characteristics which
zoology, social anatomy or inductive psychology recognize in
these various products of the natural or historical process.
I am the absolute source, my existence does not stem from my
antecedents; instead it moves out towards them and sustains
them, for I alone bring into being for myself the tradition
which I elect to carry on since that distance is not one of
3
its properties.
Scientific points of view are always naive and at the same time
dishonest because they take for granted, without explicitly mentioning
it, the other point of view; that of the consciousness, which from the
outset a world, forms itself around the individual and begins to exist
for the individual. To return to things themselves is to return to that
2
M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin
Smith (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962), p. vii.
3Ibid. , p. 54.
5world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks. It
is a relationship in which every scientific order is an abstract and
derivative, or consequential, sign language, as is geography in relation
to the countryside in which we have learned previously what constitutes
a lake, a plateau or a mountain.
Prior to the work of Merleau-Ponty, Rene Descartes, followed
by Immanuel Kant, presented consciousness as the absolute certainty
of one's existence for oneself and as the sole condition for that very
existence. It was their assumption that any research in consciousness
would entail an exploration that dealt with an analytical reflection
toward the inner man. This was to be achieved through a series of
prior constituting acts. However, for Merleau-Ponty, perception be
came the basic activity of consciousness making all cousciousness
initially perceptual and analyzing it in a primordial way with all
other resultant modes of thinking being analyzed deductively. There
fore, consciousness can have no contents and can have no independent
4
existence, no existence apart from the world. It would also follow
that there can be no intelligible thesis for idealism (a direct
opposition to the works of Descartes and Kant) which relies on the
independence of consciousness and the dependence of objects on con
sciousness .
In La Structure du Comportement, Merleau-Ponty traces the
relationships that are obtained between the perceiving organism and
its environment, to find that they are not those of an automatic
A
Robert C. Solomon, From Rationalism to Existentialism: The
Existentialists and Their Nineteenth Century Backgrounds, (New York:
Harper and Row Pub., 1972), p. 261.
6machine which needs an outside agent to set off its pre-established
mechanisms. It becomes equally clear that one does not account for
the facts by superimposing a pure, contemplative consciousness on a
thing-like body. Studies in modern psychology and physiology reveal
a sort of prospective activity in an organism, as if it entertained
certain familiar relations with them, and as if there were an a priori
(from cause to effect) of the organism, privileged conducts and laws
of internal equilibrium which predispose an organism to certain
relations with its environment. The perceiving organism shows that
there is a Cartesian mixture of the soul with the body. Existence
is seen as an incarnated mind which entertains an ambiguous relation
with the body, and, correlatively, with perceived things.
The internal relationship of the perceiving organism, that
of the mind and body, becomes the foundation for Merleau-Ponty 's
Phenomenology of Perception. Within the work, Merleau-Ponty explores
the installation of ourselves in our perceptual behaviors in order to
pursue an analysis of the relationship. Studies in psychopathology
show that the body is no longer merely an object in the world under
the power of a separated spirit. It is instead on the side of the
subject; it is our point of view on the world, the place where the
spirit takes on a certain physical and descriptive situation. As
Descartes stated:
. . . the soul is not merely in the body like a pilot in
his ship; it is wholly intermingled with the body. The body,
in turn, is wholly animated and all its functions contribute
Remy C. Kwant, The Phenomenological Philosophy of Merleau-
Ponty, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963), pp. 225-226.
7to the perception of objects.
Thus perception takes place through the unity of the mind and the body;
the body not being an object or sum of objects, but a unified field,
as is the world of objects it perceives.
External space is grasped through the bodily situation since
the body is not in space like things. It inhabits or haunts space.
Merleau-Ponty describes this relationship as follows:
The body applies itself to space like a hand to an instru
ment, and when we wish to move we do not move the body as
we move an object. We transport it as if by magic, since
it is ours and because through it we have direct access to
space. The body is much more than an instrument or a means;
it is our expression in the world, the visible form of our
intentions. Even our most secret affective movements,
those most deeply tied to the humoral infrastructure, help
to share our perception of things.
It is because of this relationship that a delicate ambiguity must
exist.
Digging down to the perceived world, it becomes noticeable
that the sensory qualities are not opaque, indivisible givens, which
are simply exhibited to a remote consciousness. Colors, each sur
rounded by an affective atmosphere, have been studied by psychologists
and are found, in themselves, to be different modalities of our co
existence with the world. Chromatic perception is illustrative of
this line of reasoning:
. . . the chromatic value assigned to an excitation depends
on the chromatic structure and also, but not exclusively,
Alden L. Fisher, ed., "An Unpublished Text by Maurice Merleau-
Ponty: A Prospectus of His Work," in The Essential Writings of Merleau-
Ponty, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1969), p. 369.
M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans.
Colin Smith (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962), p. 105.
on local excitations. For example, gray paper on a yellow
background appears blue; the background is as important as
the local excitation (the gray paper) in the perception of
blue. However, we must also consider the assignment of
spatial arrangement. When a gray ring is resting on a
background which is half green and half red the whole
ensemble is perceived, it appears gray; but when a strip
of paper or wire is laid across the ring at the point of
separation between the red and green, then half the ring
appears reddish and half appears greenish. This occurs
because in the first part of the experiment the forces of
cohesion which held the ring together were strong enough
to block out other stimulations, while in the second part
of the experiment the ring had become nonhomogenous, and
other stimulating forces took command. Changes in chromatic
perception, therefore, depend on changes in the arrangement
of the whole field and cannot be comprehended at all in
terms of a one to one correspondence of afferent and
efferent neurons.
In short, all the relations that are encountered directly or
subliminally are different ways for stimuli to test, to solicit, and
to vary our grasp on the world. One finds that perceived things,
unlike simple geometric objects, are not bounded entities whose laws
of construction we possess in a sacrosanct manner. They are open,
inexhaustible systems that one is never able to explore entirely.
9
"Our world,"as Malebranche said, "is an unfinished
task."
Every
incarnate subject is like an open notebook in which one does not
yet know what will be written. It is also like a new language; one
does not know what works it will accomplish but only that, once it
has appeared, it cannot fail to say little or much, to have a history
and a meaning. The very productivity or freedom of human life, far
Garth Gillan, ed. , The Horizons of the Flesh: Critical
Perspectives on the Thought of Merleau-Ponty, (Edwardsville, Southern
Illinois Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 8-9.
Q
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Full Encounter: Existentialism
in the Twentieth Century, ed. Garth Gillan (Edwardsville: Southern
Illinois Univ. Press, 1970), p. 582.
9from denying our situation, utilizes it and turns it into a means of
expression.
Therefore, the character of perception appears to be ambiguous.
We are in contact with things, but we cannot coincide with, or exhaust,
these things. We are rooted in truth, since we are in contact with
the real, but error and hallucination are always possible, since the
real always seems to escape us to some extent. The universality of
truth is not pronounced, but, on the contrary, emerges from the inter
section of men's lives and from the appeal of one human life to
another. The unity and articulation are both intermingled. We
experience and our experience envelopes us rather than being held
and circumscribed by our mind.
Even when one considers the field of knowledge, the field in
which the mind seeks to possess truth and to define its objects in
order to attain a universal wisdom, then one is limited. It must be
realized that knowledge is never terminated because there is no end
to the attainable due to the fact that knowledge is always permeated
with not knowing. Knowledge, as truth, cannot be delineated by firm
concepts. The whole process resists being bracketed; rather it stands
beyond these divisions as an open unity, wherein each element is
autonomous yet condemned to meaning, unique but also contributing to
the obscure but discernible systems of equivalences.
It further follows that truth does not inhabit only the inner
man, or more accurately, there is no inner man. Man is simply in the
Richard Gill and Ernest Sherman, ed., The Fabric of Existen
tialism (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), p. 568.
10
world and only in the world does he know himself. Merleau-Ponty states
the following:
. . . when I return to myself from an excursion into the realm
of dogmatic common sense or of science, I find, not a source
of intrinsic truth, but a subject destined to be in the
world.
il
Due to the fact that our existence is interwoven with the world and there
fore it is really a dialog with the world it must be realized that this
dialog reaches its most profound point on a primordial level that is
conscious of itself. Therefore, all man can do is erect some pointers
in his darkness. To reach these levels one must deal with the problem
atic of reduction. Through the work of Edmund Husserl, Merleau-Ponty
realized that the most important lesson that reduction teaches us is
12in fact the impossibility of a complete reduction. This is based on
the fact that we, as individuals, are not absolute mind, for there is
simply no thought which embraces all thought, since our reflections
are carried out in the temporal flux. This is the same flux that we
as individuals are always trying to grasp and permanently transfix.
Because man is a body-subject, truth cannot be absolute; truth
cannot be in principle universal; evidence cannot be absolute, Merleau-
Ponty approached the reality of man in the generality of a certain
idea, only to find that some aspects were very clear while others were
unable to be seen. For this reason, there is simply no room for a
conscious existence that would be reducible to the body-subject. For
M. Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, trans.
Colin Smith (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962), p. xi.
12
Robert C. Solomon, From Rationalism to Existentialsim: The
Existentialists and Their Ninteenth-Century Backgrounds, (New York:
Harper and Row Pub., 1972), p. 251.
11
this reason also, Merleau-Ponty endeavored to stress in our conscious
13
existence those aspects which point to its roots in the body-subject.
Every reduction is transcendental and eidetic. The transcend
ency lies in the realization that the only way to view the reflection
towards consciousness is to step back and lessen, so to speak, the
amount of intent which attaches one to one's world. That means that
we cannot subject our perception of the world to philosophical scru
tiny without ceasing to be identified with the act of the placement
of the world, which limits us, without drawing back from our commit
ment. It is thus made to appear as a spectacle without passing from
14
the fact of our existence to its origin. The world is spread out
and completely transparent, quickened through and through by a series
of apperceptions.
Looking for the world's essence is not looking for what it is
as an idea once it has been reduced to a theme of discourse; it is
looking for that essence as a fact for us, before any combination has
occurred. Sensationalism reduces the world by noticing that we, as
individuals, never experience anything but states of ourselves.
Cartesian idealism offers reduction as based on thought or conscious
ness of the world, minus the relationship of the body. Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty sought reduction through the determination to bring the
world to light as it is before any falling back on ourselves has
occurred and to make reflection emulate the unreflective life of
13
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Full Encounter: Existentialism
in the Twentieth Century, ed. Garth Gillan (Edwardsville: Southern
Illinois Univ. Press, 1970), p. 575.
Ibid.
12
consciousness. By virtue of this noncognitive life, we are never
genuinely detached from things; we are, in a sense, a dynamic project
continually immersed in and directed towards them. According to
Merleau-Ponty, we are in the realm of truth by the very nature of
imposing a reduction. To seek the essence of perception is to simply
declare that perception is not presumed true, but defined as access
to truth. As Merleau-Ponty stated:
. . . the world is not what I think, but what I live through.
I am open to the world, I have no doubt that I am in commu
nication with it, but I do not possess it; it is inexhaustible.
There is the world and the very facticity of the world is
what constitutes it itself and what causes the world to be
the world; just as the facticity of the cogito is not an
imperfection in itself, but rather assures one of one's
existence.
15Ibid., pp. 576-577.
CHAPTER II
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PHILOSOPHY
TO THE ARTIST
It is the artist who arrests the spectacle within which most
of humanity dwells without really seeing: hence, it is his job to
make this phenomenon visible to the most sensitive among them. For
Merleau-Ponty, there is no art for pleasure's sake alone. One can
invent pleasurable objects by linking old ideas in a new way and by
presenting forms that have been seen before; such a method of speaking
or painting indirectly is generally referred to as culture. However,
the artist is not satisfied to be a cultural beast, finding it neces
sary to assimilate this culture to its very foundations and to endow
it with a new structure. Merleau-Ponty remarks, "he speaks as the
first man spoke and paints as if no one had ever painted before."
Conversely, it must follow that what the artist expresses cannot be
the rendition of a clearly defined thought, since such clear thoughts
are those which have already been uttered by ourselves or by others.
The painter understands as he paints, not prior to the move
ment involved in the work itself. Conception does not necessarily
precede execution. Nature is not initially bestowed upon the artist
Alden L. Fisher, ed. , The Essential Writings of Merleau-
Ponty (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1969), pp. 243-
244.
13
14
but is achieved through his creative expression. He possesses nature
at a distance; it is something present to, and within him, but also
removed from him. Consequently, the artist must dissect nature in
order to grasp its unity. Insofar as he succeeds through this inter
rogation, in making available the unity of the perceptual world
2
previously hidden, the artist makes contact with existence.
For Merleau-Ponty, the artist is in the world and therefore
he is not an overman who transcends his empirical experience through
the creation of some new manner or mode. It is much more natural and
more descriptive to locate the unity of the history of painting in
the human body which paints. Consequently, in as much as there is
transcendence involved, it is a human transcendence, designated by
human works. Hence the artist takes his body with him. It is by
lending the body to the work that the artist, in himself, changes
the world into painting. In order to understand this process of con
version, one must delve back to the actual body which is, in essence,
the intermixture of movement and vision. Merleau-Ponty writes as
follows:
I have only to see something to know how to reach it and
deal with it, even if I do not know how this happens in
the nervous machine. My mobile body makes the difference
in the visible world, being a part of it; that is why I
can steer it through the visible. Conversely, it is just
as true that vision is attached to movement. Therefore, we
see only what we look at .
J
The enigma is that the body concurrently sees and is seen. In
Albert Rabil, Jr., Merleau-Ponty: Existentialist of the Social
World, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1967), p. 208.
Harold Osborne, ed. , "Eye and
Mind," in Aesthetics (London:
Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 58.
15
short, the body looks at all things and can also look at itself and
recognize, in what it sees, the other view that of the power of
inspection. The lived body is thus marked by a high degree of percep-
tiveness and originality. The body, as it is lived from the inside,
is quite different from the objective body which is observed, though
each perspective is legitimate in both a singular and a collective
sense. The two overlap in such a manner so as to maintain a per
petual dualism which is that of the seeing seen and touching
touched relationship. It is visible and sensitive for itself and
is not a self through transparence, like thought, which only acknowl
edges its objects by assimilation, constitution, or transformation
into thought. It is a self through confusion, narcissism, and in
herence.
Consequently the hereditary traits, influences, and accidents
in an artist's life are of extreme importance and are inseparable.
They give the literal significance, or occasion, to the work of art.
This occasion is not idealistically accidental, as one would logically
think, but is irrationally regarded as accidental, and yet remains
necessary. The result is an unusual paradox. The occasion's impor
tance lies essentially in the decision making of the true aesthetic
value of a production. Productions without any occasion always lack
something, due to the fact that the occasion belongs to the production.
Yet in another sense it is also foreign to it, just as a production
in which the occasion is everything also lacks something. An artist's
4Ibid.
Soren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. David F. Swenson and
Lillian Marvin Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971),
p. 234.
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works, like a person's decisions, impose a metaphorical sense that is
without precedence. Although one can be certain that a man's life
does not solely explain his work, it is equally certain that the two
entities are connected. In his essay, "Cezanne's Doubt," Merleau-
Ponty describes this relationship as follows:
. . . if I am a certain project from birth, the given and the
created are indistinguishable in me, and it is therefore
impossible to name a single gesture which is merely hereditary
or innate, a single gesture which is not spontaneous but also
impossible to name a single gesture which is absolutely new
in regard to that way of being in the world which, from the
very beginning, is myself.
Therefore, there is no difference between saying that our life
is completely constructed and that it is completely given. The very
decisions which transform us are always made in reference to a factual
situation. Such a situation can, of course, be accepted or rejected,
but it cannot fail to give us our impetus for the value we give to it.
If there is a true liberty, it can come about only in the course of
one's life by going beyond the original situation and yet not ceasing
to be the same. The two things certain about this freedom are that
we never lack determination and yet we never change. Looking back on
what we were, we can always find hints of what we have become. It is
therefore up to the individual to understand both of these things
simultaneously, as well as the way this freedom dawns in us without
denying the existence of the world.
It further follows that vision, for Merleau-Ponty, is not a
certain mode of thought or simply a presence. This vision is described
as follows:
Alden L. Fisher, ed. , The Essential Writings of Merleau-Ponty
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1969), p. 308.
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. . . it is the means for being absent from oneself, for
being present at the fission of Being from the inside;
the fission at whose termination, and not before, one
7
comes back to oneself.
Hence the painter's world is a visible world, nothing but visible.
In a sense, it is a world almost demented because it is complete and
yet, at the same time, partial. The painter is obliged to admit that
either objects which he sees are absorbed into him or that the mind
goes out through the eyes to wander among objects. Accordingly, he
must come to the realization that he can never cease adjusting his
clairvoyance. As the painter Paul Klee relates:
In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I
who looked at the forest. Some days I felt that the trees
were looking at me, were speaking to me ... I was there,
listening ... I think that the painter must be penetrated
by the universe and not want to penetrate it ... I expect
to be inwardly submerged, buried.
The vision of which Merleau-Ponty speaks has the ability to
awaken powers dormant in ordinary optics in order to pursue the secret
of pre-existence. It must be realized that art is not a construction,
nor an edifice, nor an exacting relationship to a space, nor a world
existing outside of this vision. Merleau-Ponty explains this relation
ship as follows:
. . . when through the water's thickness I see the tiling
at the bottom of the pool, I do not see it despite the water
and the reflections there; I see it through them and because
of them. If there were no distortions, no ripples of sun
light, if it were without this flesh that I saw the geometry
of the tiles, then I would cease to see it as it is and where
it is which is to say, beyond any identical, specific place.
I cannot say that the water itself the aqueous power, the
sirupy and shimmering element is in space; all this is not
Harold Osborne, ed., "Eye and
Mind," in Aesthetics (London:
Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 81.
Ibid. , p. 63.
18
somewhere else either, but it is not in the pool. It inhabits
it, it materializes itself there, yet it is not contained
there; and if I raise my eyes toward the screen of cypress
where the web of reflections is playing, I cannot gainsay the
fact that the water visits it, too, or at least sends into it,
upon it, its active and living essence.'
Likewise, it is clear that this vision cannot be separated from the
body just as one's situation cannot be separated from his perceptions.
It is a vision that opens upon a texture of existing in which the
mechanics of the eyes are only of minimal importance. "The eye lives
in this texture as a man lives in his house."
In the painter at work, Maurice Merleau-Ponty found a graphic
emblem of man's relative independence from his present existence in
his particular modes of expression. The first line, color, or shape
used on a canvas is, in a sense, stylistically predetermined. It
must respond to the exact need that impelled the artist to paint while
producing a coherent imbalance which will be equivalent of the demands
of the moment that challenged its very existence. It is essential
that this element of design echoes a new diversion to be expressed.
The artist's proficiency must be in a state of continual rebirth so
that everything that was once expressed is disclosed yet again in a
different way. Such a component is responsible in the determination
of the entire field around which the finished work of art will base
itself. It must also be emphasized that there is no one master key
to the visible. From his Critique of Reason, Merleau-Ponty writes
the following:
. . . the truly poetic moment that incarnates a new point
of view on things acts as a configuration forming corporeal
9Ibid. , p. 77.
10Ibid., p. 62.
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attitude which helps us hold off the other and asserts our
stand in relation to it; like the other expression of man's
finite freedom, it incarnates itself by using as its organ
what is already disposed in the corps propre, which it
creatively renovates, thus challenging further expression;
the new word therefore takes place in the world, rather
than appearing as an arbitrary epiphemenon; thus, once
pronounced, it necessarily remains forever inserted in
time and is capable of sedimenting in its unique and re
markable way. -1-
Moreover, it must be understood that every expression is a
limited but creative act and that it is the realization of a finite
liberty. All artistic acts are created by reference. Their reality
consists in the extension of an already given sense or in the crys
tallization of more sophisticated figures within the persisting world.
In the case of music, no figure is stated that is definable enough to
set itself up as an end of action, thus enjoying the illusion of com
prehending what exists. Painting, by contrast, can make present the
world in definite form, even going as far as attempting to reproduce
things as they are. Merleau-Ponty separates painting into two cate
gories: those works that pertain to inauthenticity and those that deal
with authenticity. Inauthentic painting is that which believes it has
found the ultimate formula for capturing any aspect of the world's
spectacle and renders it fully on canvas or paper. Authentic painting
recognizes and meets the ontological problems of configuration, even
when unconscious of its philosophical implications. Criticism demands
that the painter should not be a mere camera eye and that great works
of art should be true not to the retina but to life. Therefore, the
painter has to grasp the things he meets in a multidimensional and
perceptual experience and then distribute this experience onto a two
Thomas Langan, Merleau-Ponty
'
s Critique of Reason (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966), p. 134.
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dimensional canvas.
Despite the artist's convictions about the reality of the
things he sees and about their relation to what he has painted, the
artist is aware that he must resort to artificial methods of repre
sentation. He must adopt a system of equivalences as a means of self
expression, realizing that the criterion of any system's success is
whether or not the end configuration is true to the experience of the
world. However, he must also realize that the particular system that
he has chosen is clearly not what determines success. Analytical
perspective or panels of carefully executed gradations are not, in
themselves, panaceas any more than they can be considered as errors.
Ultimately, what each technique suggests can never be fully exhuasted,
for it implies a blending of the relationship of body-mind and being
13
into an arrangement within the world of the painter. Therefore, they
are simply ways of questioning things and their existence, ways of
implicating internal movement by which things become visible.
The painter must not be tempted to think that he can positively
bring together the whole truth of painting into his canvas or that he
can be the solitary voice of his time. Indeed the opacity of his
medium encourages him to accept completely his existence as a unique
moment, one valid result of differing points of view. Although super
ficially the opacity severs him from the flow of history, it also
anchors the artist more securely in the particular instant. The artist
is essentially cut off from any concept-based dialogue. Merleau-Ponty
elaborates as follows:
12Ibid., p. 150.
13
Ibid., p. 151.
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. . . the painter is invested in the brute, precultural,
fundamental dialogue of our perceptual presence in the
world, that most primordial of intentional transgressions.
The centering of the artist's attention on his own gesture
both his perceptual gesture and its extension and reprise
in the pictorial reveals it as momentary, limited, con
tingent; it is almost impersonal, for it originates in a
call of and is reinvested in matter, but he can neverthe
less assert it as meaningful, as sense-giving.!4
The advantage and the attractiveness of modern painting lies
in its capacity to draw attention to its system of equivalences as
gestures and to materialize the insufficiency and certainty of these
gestures. Such painting suggests the mysterious, but necessary,
relation of these gestures to a truth that is undefinable. It is a
truth that only can be implied by asserting gestures as deformations.
Thus the very strangeness, the individuality, the opacity, and the
essence of inaccessibility of modern painting emphasizes the need for
each human being to continually structure and restructure the working
material supplied by any given moment. The viewer, as well as the
painter, must accept the individualism and its limitations as well as
the element of contingency linked to the very nature of being. It is
necessary for man to reveal his notion of existence through a series
of partial truths that in some way assert themselves as moments of
substance. According to Merleau-Ponty, the real end of a painting is
to discuss, to uncover the visual world in the making. He continues
as follows:
A painter must help others experience the reality of the
life of things, of that which is not his or the viewer's
ego; he must force the contemplator to go out of himself
in order to assist at the fission of being, only at the
end of which (process), I close on myself. The result
of any painting, the authentic end of any configuration,
14Ibid., p. 155.
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is not to permit one to have the painting, but to open one
to a possession that is bipolar. 15
It is not enough for a painter, or a philosopher, to create and express
an idea; they must also awaken the experiences which will make their
idea take root in the consciousness of others. A successful work has
the strange power to teach its own lesson. Consequently, a painter can
do no more than construct an image. He must wait for this image to
come to life for other people. When it does, the work will have united
these separate lives and it will no longer exist in only one of them
like a persistent delirium, nor will it exist as a piece of colored
canvas. Merleau-Ponty writes:
Painting aims at re-creating the original source of all
sense. It is that moment when the world was first grasped
as other. It aims at provoking a movement of pulling back
into the notion of nonexistence in order to allow the
brute power of being to reveal itself, thus permitting
each structure to suggest its invisible sides, its own
partial-total world.1
Hence, Maurice Merleau-Ponty views a new humanism that is born
in contemporary painting. This humanism is a synthesis of various
inter-related assertions: the first being that man is viewed as a living
relationship with matter. This relationship takes many different forms
and therefore can never lead the way to any notion of a humanity wholly
made. Consequently, humanity is recognized as free and inventive, with
out stability, and menaced by the world. A realization must also be
made that the idea of being-in-the-world is no longer intelligible in
terms of laws, but, instead, has the character of mystery and astonish-
15Ibid., p. 151.
Garth Gillan, ed., The Horizons of the Flesh: Critical Per
spectives on the Thought of Merleau-Ponty (Edwardsville: Southern
Illinois Univ. Press, 1973), p. 107.
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ment. Just as the notion of being includes the essence of obscurity,
so does the artistic creation. Merleau-Ponty asserts that this
creation does not disclose either a finality or a pre-established
harmony, but rather a movement in which form takes possession of matter
without ceasing. Expressing what exists is an endless task.
Robert C. Solomon, From Rationalism to Existentialism: The
Existentialists and Their Nineteenth-Century Backgrounds (New York:
Harper and Row Pub., 1972), p. 294.
"
CONCLUSION
We, as individuals, live in the midst of man-made objects,
among machinery, in fabrications, in mazes of city streets, and most
of the time we see them only through the human actions which put them
to use. We become accustomed to thinking and believing that all of
this exists necessarily and unshakeably. The presence of the philos
opher, or the artist, in the world, is from that perspective an ironical
presence; for the aesthetician does not change the world but sows the
seeds of doubt among men. He makes them uneasy about themselves and
about their assurance which leads them to believe they have a firm
hold on their existence. Nevertheless, it is the very ambiguity of
this relationship of philosophy with the world and the awareness of
the impossibility of absolute revelation that opens up, within discourse,
a groundwork towards truth. Yet the essence of philosophical, or
artistic, endeavor does not consist of that consciousness by itself.
It is interested in historical man as he is engaged and existing in the
world and is not directed toward an abstract worldless consciousness.
Hence, it must be realized that the meaning of what the philosopher,
or artist, is trying to say does not exist anywhere not in things,
which as yet have no meaning, nor in the artist himself, in his unfor
mulated life. It summons one away from the already constituted
reasons in which cultured men are content to shut themselves, toward
a realm of ongoing interaction.
24
25
Art is related above all to the perceived world with which we
are in living contact. It seeks to describe that world through var
ious media, to put us in touch with it, to awaken us to the nature
of the world, and ourselves, in the presence of which we live. It
also strives to activate our freedom in that world in order to lead
us beyond what has been to what can be, through human intentions.
Thus, art is supremely responsible to society, not as an arm of
propaganda but as a means of directing toward a primordial per
ception of the world, to a fresh engagement with an open universe.
The life of the artist is therefore of a difficult nature.
He cannot help considering himself powerless because he is not
omnipotent, because he is not deified and wants nevertheless to
portray the world, to change it completely into a spectacle, to
make visible how the world touches humanity. Just as the task of a
writer is not to persuade his readers to accept his own doctrine,
but rather to encourage them to adopt a critical attitude toward
human life, so too, must be the task of the artist. Merleau-Ponty
writes in sum:
. . . the painter's aim is to make the contemplator
aware of the miracle of creativity which is hidden in
his own perceptive act, in even the most modest pre-
reflexive advance beyond the bare givens. The painter
who fails to make us see that our perception opens us
onto a fathomless sea of reality, ever capable of
deepening and reformulating, is activistic in that,
by setting a definite goal to his activity, he distorts
its true nature, which is to make other activity in its
turn possible. Activism accomplishes nothing. Without
the reference beyond, without intention, the figure
that would be in and for itself is therefore not true,
is non-sense.
Thomas Langan,
Merleau-Ponty'
s Critique of Reason (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1966), p. 152.
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The artist must also realize the contingency of his situation. He is
in the world and yet, by the very nature of his interrogation, he
leads a privileged existence that is apart from the world: not above
or beyond the world but on a plane of its own. In dealing with the
internal relationship of this existence, he must remain faithful in
his search for truth. His experiences must envelop him and he must
uphold the virtue of his convictions. Friedrich Nietzsche writes
the following:
. . . my enemies are those who want to destroy without
creating their own selves. One must therefore destroy
in order to try to create. One must extol integrity and
castigate
"hog-faced"
pleasure seekers.
The artist must not function in a realm which permits approx
imative thought to be the creator of reality; that domain wherein
intelligence seems to be the faculty for not developing what one
thinks to the very end. He must pursue the perceptual life-world and
realize that it does not consist of objective variables and functional
relationships. In doing so, he must reduce his world to the purest,
simplest, and most attainable form. The writer Hemingway concludes,
"I go through a book several hundred times, honing it until it gets
3
an edge like the bullfighter's
sword."The artist must approach the
work of art in the same manner.
The artist cannot cease from exploration. The hopeful end of
any such exploration will be for him to arrive where he started, at his
Geoffrey Clive, ed. , The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York:
The New American Library, Inc., 1965), pp. 542-543.
3A. E. Hotchner, "Ernest Hemingway: An American Original,"
TV Guide, August 15, 1981, p. 27.
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origin, and to know the place, and himself, for the very first time,
28
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